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Rawls and political realism:
Realistic utopianism or
judgement in bad faith?
Alan Thomas
Department of Philosophy, Tilburg School of Humanities,
The Netherlands
Abstract
Political realism criticises the putative abstraction, foundationalism and neglect of the
agonistic dimension of political practice in the work of John Rawls. This paper argues
that had Rawls not fully specified the implementation of his theory of justice in one
particular form of political economy then he would be vulnerable to a realist critique.
But he did present such an implementation: a property-owning democracy. An appre-
ciation of Rawls s specificationist method undercuts the realist critique of his concep-
tion of justice as fairness.
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This paper evaluates the critique of John Rawls presented by two leading ‘political
realists’, namely Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss. They were the first to
make the claim that Rawls’s work exemplifies a ‘political moralism’ that takes
political philosophy to be a form of ‘applied moral philosophy’ (Gledhill, 2012).
This moralism is to be corrected by the realist’s insight that there is a basic legit-
imation demand internal to the political that does appeal to a moral idea, but one
that emerges with the conditions of the political itself.1
The debate between realists and putative ‘moralists’ (who ought, I will suggest,
to reject this characterisation of their views by their opponents) has now acquired
considerable momentum of its own. It is internally complex and has produced
many sub-threads of discussion involving further claims and counter-claims.
My limited aim here is not comprehensively to survey these positions, rather to
question whether this whole debate set off on the wrong footing when the
realists selected Rawls as their paradigmatic political moralist. I will argue that,
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whatever the merits of the realist position, Rawls cannot appropriately be inter-
preted as its target.
I will draw on an analogy to structure my discussion: between the realists’ cri-
tique of Rawls and Hegel’s critique of Kant. The orthodox conception of this
critique is that Hegel objected to the emptiness, formality and abstraction of
Kantian morality and sought to replace it with an ethics grounded on the concrete
reality of ethical life. However, Ken Westphal has argued that this an incorrect
interpretation of this critique: properly understood, Hegel’s argument is that were it
not possible fully to specify the content of Kant’s ethical view in a fully concrete
and determinate way, then it would be open to the objection that it was abstract,
empty and formal (Westphal, 2005). But Hegel also argues that Kantian moral-
ity can be given a fully concrete and determinate specification; furthermore, he
demonstrates how this can be done. So this putative ‘critique’ of Kant is, as
it were, counterfactual: Kant’s view is merely incomplete in the sense of ‘under-
specified’. It requires a completion that Hegel finds it natural to supply – by its com-
plete specification. So both Kant’s view and Hegel’s view emerge from this exercise
vindicated in the light of a specificationist account of practical reasoning2
(Richardson, 1994).
I will develop the analogy as follows: the political realist is troubled by the
putatively ahistoricist, decontextualised and abstract nature of Rawls’s theory of
justice. Understood in this way, the political realist is playing the role of Hegel, and
Rawls the role of Kant, in the orthodox understanding of Hegel’s critique of Kant.
The realist’s version of the charges of ‘emptiness’ and ‘formalism’ is this: Rawls’s
views are damagingly indeterminate. Both the scope of Rawls’s principles and how
they are to be applied are left completely open. Being indeterminate in this sense,
they demand extension (not specification) by a process of political judgement.
But for reasons internal to the view, the realist continues, Rawls can offer no
guidance to political judgement: only the ‘prior application’ of moral principles to
politics. Gesturing in this way towards a mechanistic application of moral prin-
ciples – an ‘algorithm’ – is to name a problem, but not to solve it. The realist
deepens this objection by adding that Rawls ignores a distinctive feature of political
judgement, notably, its sensitivity to its historical circumstances. The realist con-
cludes that Rawls’s views are indeterminate, and thereby call for political judge-
ment, yet frustrate that very goal. By representing political statecraft as the
algorithmic application of prior moral principle this kind of moralism invites the
charge of bad faith: the evasion of political responsibility.
I will argue that this central realist claim is implausible because it equivocates
over the term ‘indeterminacy’. With the equivocation eliminated, I will then apply
the alternative interpretation of Hegel’s critique of Kant to the realist’s critique of
Rawls: Rawls’s view would be defensible only if it were open to a fully determinate
specification. But, were it capable of such a specification, it would be a defensible
view and the realists’ critique would lapse. I will argue that the realist critique of
Rawls does lapse once the relevant sense of indeterminacy has been identified.
The problem is that the political realist assumes that abstraction always leads to
indeterminacy in a problematic sense of ‘open’, or gappy – not covering all the
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cases that need to be covered. I will argue that this assumption is incorrect in the
case of Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness. That conception is abstract and
yet fully determinate: when specified, it can cover all the relevant cases.
Furthermore, it is embedded in a complementary account of how it constitutes a
form of ‘realistic utopianism’. It does not neglect the need to supply an account of
political judgement in modern conditions thereby showing that it is sensitive to
historical circumstance.
1. What is political realism?
Each of the realist’s three main criticisms of the political moralist is a deeper
elaboration of the criticism that the moralist takes political philosophy to consist
in the application of ‘prior’ moral principles to politics. The first criticism is that the
political moralist reverses the classical priority of politics to ethics; the second
criticism is that the political moralist fails to recognise the role of a specifically
political form of judgement; the third criticism is that the moralist is committed to
an unrealistic utopianism. The third criticism follows on from the second: it is the
failure to acknowledge the need for a craft of political prudence that explains why
the moralist is led into an unrealistic form of utopianism. I will expand on each of
these criticisms in more detail.
According to the realist, while Aristotle emphasises that the most perfect prac-
tical science is politics and that it encompasses ethics, the political moralist claims
that a ‘prior’ set of moral principles can be applied to any given political reality. It
is true that in recent political philosophy there are philosophers associated with a
broadly liberal approach to justice who do proceed in this way. Ronald Dworkin,
for example, seems to prioritise the one true theory of an ideally coherent set of
moral, political and legal values over the political process in his version of liberal-
ism (Dworkin, 2002). G. A. Cohen’s famous objection to Rawlsian special incen-
tives invokes a supplementary ethos of justice to compensate for the morally
permissible inequalities permitted by the difference principle, thereby taking a
prior moral ethos as integral to a just society. But Dworkin is not Rawls, and
Cohen is a critic of Rawls. Cohen objected to Rawls’s institutional focus; one
that putatively applied justice ‘exclusively’ to the basic structure of society.
I think one might raise the concern here that the realist is indiscriminately
aiming at a range of targets – a range that ought not to include Rawls.3
In fact, this first point needs to be handled carefully: as we shall see, one form
that the political realist’s objection to Rawls takes is that his later ‘politicisation of
justice’ was not political enough. It merely restricts the scope of a moral idea that is,
as it were, taken for granted as the appropriate starting point. If that is the ground
for the realist’s concern then it invites a response from those, like Charles Larmore,
who are sympathetic to political liberalism. Larmore argues that it is hard to see
how the political realist can avoid the same problem of presupposing a starting
point within the ethical, broadly conceived. Larmore quotes Williams’s answer to
this very question of whether his ‘Basic Legitimation Demand’ (henceforth, ‘BLD’)
is a moral principle: ‘if it is, it does not represent a morality which is prior to
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politics. It is a claim inherent in there being such a thing as politics’ (Williams,
2005: 5, emphasis added). To which Larmore quite reasonably responds that:
[T]he justification of state power . . . . has to embody an idea of what constitutes a just
political order . . . . that is not only a moral conception but one whose validity must be
understood as antecedent to the state’s own authority by virtue of serving to ground it.
(Larmore, 2012: 16)
That is why I think it is prudent, in describing the political realist’s position, to
use the phrase ‘co-originary’: the realist can continue to maintain some distance
from the moralist if Williams’s BLD has a co-originary grounding in the moral and
the political.4
That puts Williams’s concessive phrase – ‘if it is’ – to positive use in marking out
a distinct position. I think political realism has to take this ‘concessive’ form if it is
not to fall immediately to Larmore’s objection.5 This immediately marks one of the
most contentious choice points in the current debate: I will not, here, directly
consider the arguments of the non-concessive realists who hold a stronger version
of realism than Williams’s own.6 I am simply going to assume that the phrase I
have italicised in Williams’s argument represents his concession that the BLD is
both a ground of political authority and a ground for a distinctively ethical justi-
fication. Using the phrase ‘ethical justification’ leaves it open whether this justifi-
cation is principled or whether it involves a specific candidate principle (Larmore’s
principle is equal respect for persons). I think those questions ought to be left open;
my point is that Williams has to be interpreted as what I have called a ‘concessive
realist’.
The realist’s second objection is that the political moralist simply ignores
the centrality to political practice of a specifically political form of judgement.
The realist argues that, like all judgement, it has accord with its special sub-
ject matter. Political judgement is akin to a craft skill that allows a political
actor to navigate through contingent circumstances to determine what is, and
what is not, genuinely politically possible. It is this tacit, practice dependent,
form of judgement that allows political proposals to pass the test of being realis-
tically utopian.
This is the basis of the political realists’ error theory for the defects of moralism:
this fact about judgement explains why the political moralist is committed to an
unrealistic utopianism. A systematic insensitivity to the historical situatedness of
political action explains why the moralist is prone to the vice of wishful thinking.
The lesson of the Frankfurt School, however, is that a critical social theory is
reflexively sensitive to the conditions of its own application. In Geuss’s case this
seems to take the form of a global pessimism that any form of ethical life is so much
as possible in circumstances such as our own (at least, in his special sense of ‘the
ethical’).7 This is to follow Adorno’s historical precedent: to adopt the view that
our human potentiality for ethical life remains in place but is currently suffocated
by our political and institutional conditions8 (Adorno and Gehlen, 1983: 246–7;
Freyenhagen, 2013).
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So the second and third components of the realists’ critique of moralism easily
cohere: the claim is that Rawls’s view is unrealistically utopian because of its ahis-
torical, abstract and foundationalist character. Its rationalist origins explain why
we are not dealing here with any piece of ‘pure’ moral philosophy that is then
‘applied’ to political reality. This is, instead, a specific conception of how moral
philosophy ought to proceed in a way such that it can remain indifferent to issues
of context and history. The issue, then, is not simply characterised by the idea of
‘prior application’ taken as a stand-alone idea. It matters what is applied and how it
is applied: it is because moralism deals in timeless and universal truths that a
rationalist moral theory can remain indifferent both to its context of discovery
and its context of application. It is that specific aspect of Rawls’s putative political
moralism that explains its neglect of a historical sense either of its own possibility,
its own historical emergence at a particular point in time or of the conditions of its
application. (Where one might reasonably take those two ideas – conditions of
emergence and of application – to be connected.) That is why the moralist is
assumed to be in the business of producing a particular beˆte noire of Williams’s,
namely a ‘Whiggish history’ of its own inevitable triumph via the winning of
arguments.
2. Is Rawls a political moralist?
David Estlund has remarked that Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and Political
Liberalism really have different subject matters: the former, justice and its stability,
the latter, legitimacy (Estlund, 1996: 68). The political realist moves freely from the
putatively rationalist and foundationalist claims in A Theory of Justice to the ques-
tion of legitimacy addressed separately by Political Liberalism.9 It is the fact that
Rawls offers an abstract, ahistorical and rationalistic account of justice that is the
basis of the realist charge that he simply imposes upon any political circumstancest
he content of his ‘prior’ moral theory.
This is to ignore both Rawls’s explicit commitment to reflective equilibrium
and his detailed discussion of the nature of political legitimacy in a modern soci-
ety developed in Political Liberalism.10 Specifically, it ignores its explanation of
why Rawls believed that no political conception of justice could be based on
any single comprehensive conception of the good. Any such conception would
fail to acknowledge the particular, practical task of ‘reconciliation’ that political
philosophy faces in our historically determined situation of reasonable pluralism
(Rawls, 2001: 29, 41)
This aspect of the realist critique seems to me the least convincing because it
ignores the division of labour between different parts of Rawls’s view. The subject
of legitimacy has a wider, more encompassing scope than the relatively narrow
scope of the theory of justice. Addressing the reflexive precondition of its own
possibility is the task of political liberalism which, whatever its ultimate plausibil-
ity, can hardly be accused of being a theory which ignores its historical situatedness.
Realists may find Rawls’s historical narrative thin and unconvincing, but that is a
different criticism from the claim that he does not provide one.
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The embedded core of political liberalism is Rawls’s specific conception of just-
ice as fairness that is, I will argue, in one sense abstract and yet in another sense
fully determinate. The aim of those narrower reflections on justice is to devise a
model that gives us insight into that which we already believe and then to derive
further, surprising, consequences from it. The acceptability of that model itself
depends on the process of wide reflective equilibrium. To use Onora O’Neill’s
important distinction, this model is an abstract one, but not an idealised one,
and it offers a justification that each of us can accept (O’Neill, 1989). The model
says nothing about its historical and social context only because that part of the
view was not intended to do so. It is the surrounding context of political liberalism
that politicises justice in the light of a reasonable moral pluralism that has emerged
in recognisably modern conditions.
That is, however, only my first objection to the realists’ misrepresentation of the
relation between Rawls’s conception of legitimacy and his conception of justice: the
second objection is that not even the narrowly conceived model of justice works in
an abstract, rationalist and ‘fact insensitive’ way. If the theory of justice is puta-
tively a case of the mere ‘application’ of a prior moral idea, then it is surely sig-
nificant that Rawls is using one of the methods of application traditionally used in
political philosophy. That method of application is institutional design.11 To bring
out Rawls’s radicalism on this score, it is helpful to compare his view, once again,
to Cohen’s.
Cohen complained that Rawls confused justice with mere expediency and that
Rawls applies his principles to ‘the political’ in a way that excludes ‘the personal’.
Cohen introduced his own supplementary ethos in a way that spans both the pol-
itical and the personal, but this seems to me simply to highlight the extent to which
Cohen and Rawls are at cross-purposes over the scope of justice (Thomas, 2011).
But one of the weakest aspects of Cohen’s critique of Rawls was that it misunder-
stood Rawls’s institutional focus.
In the background here are Cohen’s meta-ethical commitments; this reflects the
fact that if any philosopher held a view in recent political philosophy tailor made
for the realist’s critique, it was Cohen. While our ordinary political reasoning may
be concerned with practicality or feasibility, for him these limited, context-specific
aims deal only with what seem to be reasons. These apparent reasons very often
take the form of that which Cohen called ‘rules of regulation’, namely devices for
achieving our goals in the face of the facts and conflicting principles (Cohen, 2008:
chapters 6 and 7). But as well as the apparent reasons there are the real, or ultimate,
reasons. When we isolate this pure part of normative theorising we find Platonic
principles that are fact insensitive. So with this distinction drawn, Cohen can then
perform reconstructive surgery on Rawls’s view, isolating the pure part that genu-
inely reflect the demands of justice while rejecting other parts of the view (notably
the difference principle) as trading in merely expedient rules of regulation. Such
expedient rules are involved in failed compromises with the recalcitrant facts, not-
ably, facts about current human motivational profiles. The only point I want to
highlight here in this fundamental clash of outlooks is that institutions, too, are for
Cohen ‘downstream’ of any pure concern for justice.
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I highlight the point to bring out how implausible it is for the realist to claim that
Rawls’s algorithmically applies a set of moral principles to a recalcitrant political
reality (while also noting this is a perfectly reasonable interpretation of how Cohen
proceeds).12 If Rawls views institutional implementation as a constitutive expression
of his own ‘pre-distributive’ version of egalitarianism, then how can he also be
indifferent to history and context? It would be remarkably myopic to believe that
the basic institutions of a society are not the contingent products of its history. This
is true even of the relatively schematic regime types that Rawls discusses, namely
property-owning democracy and liberal market socialism (Rawls, 2001).
So when the realist treats Rawls as merely applying principles of justice the
target can only be Cohen, not Rawls. Cohen relegates Rawls’s institutionalism
to the mere ‘application’ phase whereby one applies pre-given ultimate principles
to actual cases. But that is to misunderstand Rawls’s insistence that justice is the
primary virtue of social institutions; for Rawls the connection between principles
and institutional implementation is constitutive, not instrumental. In explaining
this difference between Cohen’s ultimate ‘fact insensitive’ norms of justice and
Rawls’s institutionalism, the analogy with Hegel’s critique of Kant can again do
some real work in addressing the realists’ critique.
The pertinent issue is not method – a specificationist model of practical reason-
ing – but the nature of the principles thus specified. Cohen’s Platonic conception of
political principles contrasts with Rawls’s conception of such principles as neces-
sarily formulated for the kind of object that they seek to regulate. Arthur Ripstein
has insightfully observed that Rawls’s highest order (and only ‘fact insensitive’)
ultimate principle is this: ‘an object is to be assessed in light of the standard that is
internally appropriate to its nature’13 (Ripstein, 2010: 678). This principle is then
applied to various sub-categorical domains. Ripstein also notes that the closest
antecedent to Rawls’s use of this principle is Hegel’s appeal to the a priori category
of ‘life’ that is then further specified under more specific governing concepts. To
derive the true generic sentences about the flourishing of the various different life
forms, there is ineluctable appeal to facts about those species and their form of life.
Ripstein sees Rawls as following the same strategy:14
(A) ‘fact free’ norm directs you to find a thing’s regulative principle in its nature, and
so determines which facts will be relevant . . . . But the fact-free norms are insufficient
to provide suitable regulative principles, even at a very high level of abstraction; they
tell you only what it is to have an adequate solution to a practical problem. Facts
further specify the problem and its solution . . .. the general facts to which (Rawls)
appeals are always introduced in relation to the idea of social cooperation, not in
relation to the prospects for achieving an already completed idea of justice. (Ripstein,
2010: 684)
When Rawls appeals to specific facts with a bearing on the nature of social
cooperation, once again it would be very implausible to claim that this is not
shaped by the contingent historical features of the nature of production.15 The
Humean ‘circumstances of justice’ may indeed be abstract enough to be reasonably
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historically invariant, but the specific economic facts to which Rawls appeals are
clearly only applicable to certain societies at certain times. As Ripstein further
notes, the problem situation for political liberalism becomes even more narrowly
specified again when reasonable pluralism and its converse, the ‘fact of oppression’,
enter into the determination of the ‘problem situation’.
So there is no plausible interpretation of Rawls such that he can be seen, in his
theory of justice, as merely ‘applying’ the content of a theory already given to the
facts of our existing institutions. His only principle that is ‘fact insensitive’ is a
methodological one. In the background here, motivating this misguided criticism is
a deep assumption that Rawls’s realist critics make about an inherent connection
between one view of abstraction and one conception of indeterminacy. It is that
issue I would now like to consider in more detail.
3. ‘Abstraction’ and in/determinacy
The realist claims that Rawls’s views are abstract, and hence indeterminate, in a
damaging way. It is true that, to discharge its task, the initial model of our inchoate
intuitions about liberty, equality and justice is an abstract one. We then confirm the
model in wide reflective equilibrium. We then further proceed to derive further,
surprising, consequences from the model.16 We discover that the only way in which
our society can be just is if it implements one, determinate, form of political econ-
omy: either a property-owning democracy or liberal market socialism. This is, of
course, a relatively abstract form of political economy. But it combines relative
abstraction with determinacy: perhaps the best word is that it is ‘schematic’, like a
circuit diagram.
When we form more abstract representations from more concrete ones we select
and thereby lose data (Dennett, 1991). Some data are picked out as ‘the real pat-
tern’ while other data are relegated to mere ‘noise’. But this process can produce
two quite different results: some abstract representations produced by loss of data
are fuzzy, producing vagueness and gaps. Data loss here is combined with a lack of
full determinacy. But other abstract representations – schematic representations –
can remain fully determinate. An analogy might be with stripping away data from
a complex representation, like a picture: the result might be fuzzy and indetermin-
ate, or it might be a line drawing that preserves the determinate form of that which
is depicted.17
This general point is connected to Rawls’s specificationist model of reasoning:
any such view takes a principle that is relatively abstract, and determinate, and
more precisely specifies a derived principles in the light of relevant facts (derived
ultimately, as we have seen, from the ‘nature’ of the object theorised) (Richardson,
1994; Ripstein, 2010). The differences between principles at varied levels of speci-
ficity are ones of degree, not of kind, just like the relation between the information
expressed by the painting and the line drawing is a difference of degree, not kind.
The salient piece of information – the real pattern – is preserved by isomorphism.
So the ‘abstraction’ of Rawls’s principles is compatible with their full determinacy
and he does have a theory of judgement (or ‘application’), namely
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specificationism.18 Rawls’s own working out of the consequences of his views vin-
dicates my analogy with Hegel’s specification of Kant’s list of moral duties: this is
not an ‘empty formalism’. Abstraction, here, does not imply emptiness: a schematic
view is abstract, but not for that reason unclear in the institutional forms it has to
take, nor ‘gappy’, nor in any other way incomplete until it is interpreted. The
method of specification is neither an ‘algorithmic’ account of political judgement
nor an evasion of the responsibility to be sensitive to context. Specification is
sensitivity to context.
We can now re-cast the realists’ objection this way: had Rawls’s conception of
justice remained abstract and thereby indeterminate in the sense of gappy, then it
would have been objectionable and given us no sense of how to implement it. But
there is an assumption underlying that criticism that, when analysed, cannot be
justified: the assumption that abstraction leads to an empty indeterminacy. So this
aspect of the realists’ critique simply lapses: we have fully determinate advice as to
how to implement justice as fairness.
The combination of justice as fairness and political liberalism offers two things:
first, a fully determinate specification of the nature of a just society; second, the
need for political judgement in probing the limits of the practically possible judged
from our own position – where else? Once again, I think an analogy with Hegel’s
views can explain the strategy that Rawls intended to follow in establishing that his
views were realistically utopian. However, as a necessary preface to that discussion,
I need to set out the realist’s very different understanding of how justice ought to be
‘politicised’.
4. Realism and the politicisation of justice
As I have described, Rawls conceives of political liberalism as the ‘politicisation’ of
the ideas needed to express a conception of justice as fairness. That view is affirmed,
in a strictly political conception, by a range of different reasonable conceptions of
the good. The realist implies that this strategy fails by its own lights as it strategy of
‘politicisation’ is not radical enough. The realist concedes that perhaps the strategy
itself reflects a belated recognition by Rawls that he needs to address the problem
of political judgement, but this aim is not matched by what he actually says. Both
criticisms are clearly expressed by Williams who reviewed Political Liberalism on its
first appearance (Williams, 1993). But examining that review also makes it clear
that Williams made two very uncharitable assumptions about Rawls’s actual views
that shaped his critique.19
The first flawed assumption is that Rawls’s appeal, in his later work, to the idea
of an overlapping consensus is an appeal to a de facto set of agreements. The
second flawed assumption is Williams’s counter-assertion that an accurate history
of our political situation would show we are not entitled even to that much.
Williams implied that the most we can actually find, in modern political conditions,
is the minimal content of that which Judith Shklar called the ‘liberalism of fear’
(Shklar, 1992). The historical experiences appealed to in Rawls’s (admittedly sket-
chy) account of the pre-history of our current political circumstances only entitle us
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to a thin conception of a way of living together that, as Williams memorably put it,
is an alternative to dying together.
From Williams’s perspective, Rawls’s project is flawed because it lacks any
historical sense that it is a product of modernity and, furthermore, a product of
social and historical circumstances that cannot be reflexively represented at the
level of theory. Because the view is abstract, decontextualised and a-historical it
incorporates a false historical self-understanding by default. It tells itself a
Whiggish history of its own inevitable historical triumph and engages in the self-
vindicatory fantasy of believing it could, in the guise of Kant, have given advice on
statecraft at King Arthur’s Court. It would be in a position to do so because it is
timelessly true. That is why it does not take itself to need a theory of its own
historical preconditions or to thematise the conditions of its own application; the
question is evaded.
I would like to split Williams’s critique and evaluate its two aspects separately.
I will begin with his claim that all we can justify is the liberalism of fear before
going on to his more fundamental objection that Rawls treats an overlapping
consensus as a de facto set of agreements.
The putative contrast between Williams’s view and Rawls’s ‘political moralism’
is undermined by the equivocations that run throughout the whole discussion; it is
hard to avoid the conclusion that both parties are talking past each other. First,
one can set aside the claims that Williams makes about Rawls’s methodology that
are incorrect: Rawls’s project is much more similar to the later method of geneal-
ogy that Williams himself applied to the virtues surrounding propositional truth
(Williams, 2002). Rawls always worked within a set of ideas that are relatively
internal to our own traditions of reflection. Qua epistemological contextualist,
Rawls appeals to our shared knowledge and standards of relevance that together
constitute our problem-solving situation. In that situation we reason from a con-
text of background belief where some beliefs are challenged while others ‘stand
fast’ for us (Thomas, 2006).
Noting this point allows an irony to emerge from the realist’s putative critique:
from the perspective of his own contextualism Rawls felt entitled to rely on some
contingent historical truths that play the role of those ‘hinge propositions’ that
work as unearned entitlements in our reasoning. (These are analogous to the ‘hinge
propositions’ of Wittgenstein’s (1975) On Certainty.) Williams, in his putatively
competing account of the modern context of our inherited ideas also believes that
some ideas ‘stand fast’ for us and he explicitly invokes Wittgenstein. The irony is
that the very same ideas stand fast for Williams as stand fast for Rawls, namely the
truth of liberalism. Williams is just as drawn to the conception of the truth of
liberalism for us as constituted by a set of default entitlements.20
Perhaps, in noting this parallelism, I have not appreciated Williams’s point that
while ‘now and around here the B(asic) L(egitimation) D(emand) together with the
historical conditions permit only a liberal solution: other forms of answer are
unacceptable’ he immediately adds a rider: ‘[I]t is not, though it is often thought
to be, because some liberal conception of the person, which delivers the morality of
liberalism, is or ought to be seen to be correct’ (Williams, 2005: 8).
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That objection might well take a wide range of perfectionist liberalisms from
Mill to Raz as its appropriate target; Williams’s specific target in this passage is the
work of Carlos Santiago Nino. But Rawls was not a perfectionist liberal and con-
sistently denied that his work, early or late, ever committed him to a ‘theory of the
person’ (Rawls, 1993: 27). Williams seems to take as his target one foundationalist
liberal project that gives the autonomy of the persona central place but that was
never Rawls’s view.
His abstract description of our two fundamental powers of rationality and rea-
sonableness does not constitute any ‘theory of the person’: they are an identifica-
tion of our highest order interests. Rawls’s task is to describe a realistically utopian
set of social conditions in which they will be expressed and not frustrated. It is hard
to see how the concessive realist could disagree with that task specification for a
‘reconciliationist’ political philosophy.21
Williams may not believe that liberalism is the expression, in our local context of
some set of timeless abstract truths, but he certainly believes that liberalism is true
for us – and ‘inescapably’ so. Now the putative point of dispute between his view
and political liberalism is the extent to which the historical conditions that form an
essential pre-condition of the inescapability of liberalism for us can be reflexively
acknowledged within the view itself. To that end, Williams presents a broader and
wider historical narrative to explain this inescapability than Rawls supplies:
[I]t is a luxury to be able to discuss the precise value of truthfulness in politics and
its relation to other political values. Political, particularly governmental, truthfulness
is valuable against tyranny, but you will get it only as associated with other values and
expressed in a set of institutions and practices that stand as a whole against tyranny.
For us now, this takes the form of liberalism. Liberal societies are more successful in the
modern world than others in helping people (at least in their own territories – their
influence elsewhere has been less benign) to avoid what is universally feared: torture,
violence, arbitrary power, and humiliation. This is the basis of the outlook that the
late Judith Shklar . . . . called . . . . the ‘liberalism of fear’. . . . the value of the whole
enterprise, political truthfulness included, is to be measured against the evils that it
resists. (Williams, 2002: 208–209, emphasis added)
This is certainly a broader and deeper narrative than any Rawls explicitly devel-
oped:22 were it acceptable then it would indeed combine the desiderata of being the
‘least ambitious’ and so ‘most convincing’ explanation of why the truth of liberal-
ism stands fast for us.23
But there are two problems with Williams’s strategy here: the first is the danger
that his weak and widely shared view is political in what Rawls called ‘the wrong
way’ – an ironic inversion of Williams’s claim that an overlapping consensus is the
dead hand of a de facto consensus. The second is that the extent of normative
disagreement with Rawls is now becoming very tenuous. The political liberal is
simply assuming something that Williams wants to prove, namely that there is a
historical narrative that not simply describes the emergence of liberalism for us, but
justifies it in a way that captures its ‘inescapability’. What can ‘inescapable’ here
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mean than the Wittgensteinian point that, for example, the principle of equal
respect is a default entitlement that we reason from? That contextualist point is,
as we have seen, shared both by Rawls and by Williams as their default starting
point. But ironically it is Williams the realist who has a more demanding standard
of justification than Rawls the alleged moralist.
Williams treats the truth of liberalism as a truth that ‘stands fast’ for us, even if
it is in the guise of the weakest and most widely shared form of the ‘liberalism of
fear’ that is constituted by a core set of human rights protections. Similarly, the
political liberal speaks from the pragmatist tradition that takes our current com-
mitments as a going concern, demands that alternatives to our ways of going on
to be fully specified (i.e. ‘realistic’), or abandoned, and has a realistic faith in
the (limited) power of reason.24 What is curious about this putative conflict
is that it is the political realist whose putative goal is to dig deeper than the rela-
tively shallow ‘foundations’ of the pragmatist-cum-contextualist defender of
Rawls.25 I concede that the result of Williams’s excavations is a weaker liberal
commitment, but that simply makes very pressing Rawls’s concern that in trying
to dig deeper the political realist gets a weaker, more widely shared, but indefensible
commitment.
For Williams the content of the moral claims that are strictly ‘co-originary’ with
the demands of the political itself are a very basic set of rights claims to be distin-
guished from a larger set of liberal rights. Williams, unlike Rawls, always connects
that more expansive set of rights with a liberal conception of autonomy that
Williams thought was flawed, precisely the kind of ‘foundation’ for liberalism
that Rawls also rejected. For the former minimal set, but not for the latter expan-
sive set, we are guaranteed near universality of application to any situation where
power is exercised within a social group such that it can meet the Basic
Legitimation Demand.
Exactly like Rawls in the formulation of his ‘law of peoples’, Williams then
draws a distinction between illegitimate political orders, the legitimate and the
liberal, and the legitimate and the decent (but illiberal). The class of the legitimate
respects a very narrow range of rights that can be grounded on universally recog-
nised wrongs, but it is a delicate question how Williams can draw a distinction
between this narrow class and the wider set of liberal rights. If he fails to do so,
then his view is political ‘in the wrong way’ and any dialectical advantage that his
view derives from its weaker and wider ‘foundations’ than Rawls’s is purchased at
an unacceptable cost.
Alex Bavister-Gould has pressed this question: the test case for Williams is the
difference between a slave society containing happy slaves and a theocratic society
that coercively imposes restrictive gender roles on people in a way that is, in that
society, universally endorsed (Bavister-Gould, 2011: 9–10). Williams treats the
former case as not actually involving the political, but merely seeming to do
so as the basic condition for the political is not met. He has to treat the lat-
ter case differently: as an example of a legitimate, but illiberal and decent society.
This judgement would have to be grounded on the fact that this violation of liberal
rights connects to a wider sense of what is valued by those within it.
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To the Rawlsian, who draws this distinction between liberal and decent societies
differently, this simply illustrates the dangers of seeking universal and widely
shared norms that are co-originary with the political. The result is ‘political in
the wrong way’ and that is shown by Williams’s failure to follow through on his
own critical theory test in the case of the theocentric and hierarchical society.26
Williams’s hedging as to whether or not such a hierarchical society meets the basic
condition of legitimacy illustrates the hazards of his weak and widely shared con-
ception. Shklar’s ‘liberalism of fear’ (and the associated conception of a merely
modus vivendi liberalism) are both exemplary of merely bargaining conceptions of
liberalism. That which you and I have to agree to in order to avoid the alternative
of potentially lethal conflict will, indeed, involve each of us reasoning from how
much we are prepared to give up to go on sharing this political space. But that is
not enough to sustain the idea of a fair society to which we can be reconciled as
hospitable to the realisation of our moral powers, nor even that of a decent society
in Rawls’s sense.
As Bavister-Gould also notes one of the reasons that Williams wants to distin-
guish the core ethical content that is co-originary with the BLD from a wider set of
liberal values is because of the role played by his theory of that which makes a
society modern (Bavister-Gould, 2011: section VI). Williams sees the rise of the
regulatory state as demanding that more and more decisions that bear on the
private be made in a publicly justifiable way. This produces a pressure to trans-
parent principles. But that pressure, which Williams accepts, also seems to him to
lead to such principles being formulated in an increasingly ‘thin’ vocabulary and to
push the theory of justice into purely procedural formulations.
But it is hard to see how this places Williams and Rawls on opposite sides of this
issue: Rawls would simply have replied that the concept of justice is neither thick
nor thin, so it falls outside the scope of this historical narrative of increasing
rationalisation whereby thick vocabulary is displaced, under the impact of reflec-
tion, by the thin.27 Furthermore, on any realistic understanding of this process it
draws a distinction of degree and not of kind when it comes to the extent of the
‘loss’ of our moral knowledge (Thomas, 2006: chapters 7 and 8; Williams, 1985:
143–148). Williams wanted us to put a preservation order on the thick ethical
concepts we still have and to resist the pressure of a ‘rationalistic conception of
rationality’ (Williams, 1985: 18). But the prospect he discusses of an ‘indirect vin-
dication’ of our moral knowledge makes no sense if we have lost all our thick
ethical concepts and are left only with the thin.28 If, on a realistic conception of
our situation, we can have confidence in many concepts placed along the range
between the thick and the thin then it is open to Rawls to surmise that justice is
located in that range.
We also know that Rawls is not a pure proceduralist about justice; given the
bearing of facts about market society on the content of the terms of fair social
cooperation Rawls is committed to ‘adjusted procedural justice’ (Thomas, 2011).
That adjustment is made to the background institutions of the basic structure;
again, it would be remarkable to interpret Rawls as insensitive to the historical
conditions that determine what those institutions are in our historical situation.
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Perhaps the most constructive rapprochement between the two views is this: both
the moralist and the realist are committed to truthfulness, in the sense of accuracy.
An accurate history of how liberal principles have come to stand fast us need not
always represent them as having done so by winning arguments. Williams’s emphasis
on practice implies that sometimes societies become both sociologically and politic-
ally modern as a result of social and cultural changes that are not driven by explicit
theory. There are dramatic cases where founding legitimation myths are revealed to
be myths, but also a range of cases where putative justifications do not need to be
refuted, as social change simply puts them out of business. I agree with all of that,
but it is puzzling to me why the Rawlsian cannot agree also; or, at least, why any part
of their view forces them to deny it. Williams is particularly allergic to ‘Whiggish’
histories of liberalism, but that is surely an inessential part of any view like political
liberalism. Rawls’s admittedly limited historical examples point to the experience of
divisive religious war as one of the bases for political liberalism, but this is to point to
a collective historical experience, not to the winning of any arguments.
The element of contingency in Rawls’s view involves which social practices there
are, described at different levels of abstraction, and the further question of whether
bringing practices into line with the aims to which we have interpreted them as
committed are realistic given ‘favourable conditions’. All of the foregoing implies
that the realists’ claim that Rawls failed to address the historical conditions for the
application of his own views is difficult to reconcile with his extended consideration
of realistic utopianism.29 As Gledhill argues:
What Rawls argues is realistic, then, about the substantive conception of justice repre-
sented through the utopian standpoint of the original position is that it is consistent with
the historical circumstances of our social world. And understanding the presuppositions
of its own possibility is integral to the process of political liberalism finding a place within
the public political culture of amodern constitutional democratic society. An overlapping
consensus on the principles of justice as fairness will be shown to be the ‘deepest andmost
reasonable basis of social unity available to us in a modern democracy’, one that can
reconcile us to our social world. (Gledhill, 2012, citing Rawls, 1996: 98–99, 391)
Rawls does not think of an overlapping consensus as a set of pre-given answers,
but rather as a way of framing our problems. It follows that he does not pre-empt
the need for political judgement in order to solve those problems.30
5. Conclusion
On one way of understanding Hegel’s critique of Kant it is Rawls who is slotted into
the role of the abstract, empty, formalist whose work calls for a concrete specifica-
tion, via a specifically political form of judgement, that Rawls is debarred from
supplying himself. This paper suggests that we can read that original critique differ-
ently; Kant’s views would be empty were they not capable of determinate and con-
crete specification, but Hegel completes that project and vindicates both projects.
On this understanding of the analogy the appropriate comparison is between Rawls
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and Hegel: both take it that: ‘[T]he very possibility of persons conceiving of them-
selves as free and equal, and having the appropriate concepts so to regard them-
selves is a historical achievement’ (Ripstein, 2010: 683, emphasis added).
They share a methodology that applies ‘fact insensitive principles’ to determinate
historical circumstances to yield abstract and yet fully determinate principles that are
open to further specification. When Rawls stated he sought a view that ‘reconciled’ us
to a social world that permitted the full expression of our two moral powers the
invocation of Hegel in this remark is more than a suggestive hint. Developing the
analogy between Rawls and Hegel allows one to locate Rawls in the contextualist and
pragmatic traditions. Were his principles not open to concrete specification in one,
determinate, form of political economy they would be a proper object of realist cri-
tique. But they can be so specified, so the undoubted insights of the political realists’
critique are those that the Rawlsian can accept and endorse with equanimity.31
Notes
1. This exegetical claim is already controversial: it divides those realists who believe that the
political and the moral are mutually exclusive categories, such as Enzo Rossi, from those –
such as myself, Edward Hall (2013), and Matt Sleat (2010, 2011, 2015) – who believe that
they intersect and precisely do so in the Basic Legitimation Demand. See Rossi (2010, 2012,
2013) for defences of the view I call ‘non-concessive realism’. My limited focus in this paper
is on concessive realism solely on grounds of scope; non-concessive realism, more indebted
to Geuss than to Williams, deserves separate consideration.
2. See also Scanlon (1998, 2000: 309) for a clear exposition of how, on a specificationist
view, to apply a principle is to make it more complex, but in so doing also rules out any
possible conflict with alternative principles.
3. My concern in this paper is solely to exonerate Rawls from the realists’ critique (Rawls,
1971, 1999); I would not deny that there are several examples tailor made to fit the
description of a ‘political moralist’ – Nozick (1974) is an obvious example.
4. Taken in context, I do not think this issue is illuminated by Williams’s distinction between
‘the moral’ and ‘the ethical’ as drawn in Williams (1985) chapter 10: the word ‘moral’
does not have to be freighted with the special assumptions of the Morality System.
5. In his helpful discussion of E. H. Carr’s critique of utopianism, Rawls notes that:
Carr . . . . presented reasonable political opinions as a compromise between
both realism (power) and utopianism (moral judgement and values).
In contradistinction to Carr, my idea of a realistic utopia doesn’t settle
for a compromise between power and political rights and justice, but
sets limits to the reasonable exercise of power. Otherwise, power itself
determines what the compromise should be, as Carr recognized’. (Rawls,
1999: 6, fn. 8)
It seems to me reasonable to interpret this passage as expressing a commitment to concessive
realism: as concerned with the moral ‘limits to the reasonable exercise of power’.
6. The paradigmatic non-concessive realist is Geuss himself; while he and Williams share a
common line of objection to moralism they diverge over what ought to take its place.
The distance between them comes across clearly in Geuss (2005, 2008, 2014a).
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7. See, for example
Ethics is usually dead politics: the hand of a victor in some past conflict
reaching out to try to extend its grip to the present and the future . . . recog-
nition of this necessity gives us no reason to romanticize it. (Geuss, ‘Moralism
and Realpolitik’, 2010: 42)
8. So an aim common to Geuss and Rawls – a political world to which we can be ‘recon-
ciled’ – frames a radical disagreement over whether this aim can be realised under
current conditions. See footnote 21 below.
9. I say ‘putatively rationalist and foundationalist’ for two reasons: first, Rawls’s con-
structivism is restricted to constructivism about justice and he was always clear that a
construction process depended on some material that remains unconstructed. This is
not, then, a pure rationalism of epistemically self-standing privileged procedures.
Furthermore, I have argued, in a previous publication, that Rawls’s commitment to
reflective equilibrium is compatible with contextualism about justifications of belief
change. So while reflective equilibrium is compatible with either coherentism or con-
textualism it is incompatible with foundationalism. See Thomas (2006) chapter eight
where I contrast my position with that of DePaul (1986) and Ebertz (1993). (Resolving
the question of whether inferential contextualism is a version of ‘modest foundational-
ism’ goes beyond the scope of this paper.)
10. Rawls insists on the distinctness of issues of legitimacy and justice in Rawls (1996: 427–
428). Matt Sleat (2015) argues that all legitimate states ‘use their power in accordance
with a just constitution’ (Sleat draws in turn on the arguments of Simmons (1999), 759–
760, fn. 48). But ‘in accordance with’ is a very lax constraint; legitimate legislation
cannot be inconsistent with the constraints of a just constitution in so far as the consti-
tution and the legislation bear on each other. But pointing to an area of overlap is not to
assert an identity.
11. Furthermore, institutional implementation of principles seriatim, assuming each lexic-
ally prior principle is fully implemented to structure the context for the application of
the lexically subordinated principle, and implementation in current and actual institu-
tions whose nature is well understood, Rawls (2001: 43, fn. 5).
12. Katrina Forrester (2012) cites this passage from a Rawlsian lecture of 1983:
Williams is right that there can be no ethical theory as he describes it, that is, a
philosophical structure which together with some degree of empirical fact,
yields a decision procedure for moral reasoning. Indeed, very often what
Williams says seems correct, the problem is that his claims are somewhat
exaggerated. Thus, who claims that ethical theory can provide a decision pro-
cedure? What is such a procedure? Perhaps, though, while it cannot provide a
decision procedure, it can provide something else. (Rawls, 1983) cited by
Forrester (2012: 264)
13. As Ripstein also points out, this is one of the keys to understanding Rawls’s
normative pluralism: the principles governing the basic structure of society do not
directly regulate the internal lives of particular associations. But then they are
a different kind of entity ordered by different constitutive principles. (Ripstein,
2010: 682).
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14. Ripstein’s concern is to defend Rawls from Cohen’s critique in its methodological
dimension; he expresses the worry that he may not be successful given that Rawls
seems committed to a problematic form of ‘essentialism’ (Ripstein, 2010: 683). At this
point I think it would be fair to introduce Charles Larmore’s observation that Cohen’s
commitment to a hybrid ethical theory at least proves this much: that Cohen must be
committed to Samuel Scheffler’s basic rationale for any such theory, which is that it
must be adjusted to the kind of object for which it is a theory, namely persons with a
personal point of view that is ethically significant. For further discussion of the consist-
ency of Cohen’s combination of Platonism, hybrid theory and a critique of Rawlsian
special incentives, see Thomas (2011).
15. This is to interpret Rawls as committed to the thesis that Andrea Sangiovanni labels as
the ‘Practice-dependence Thesis’, namely that ‘The content, scope, and justification of a
conception of justice depends on the structure and form of the practices that the con-
ception is intended to govern’ (Sangiovanni, 2008: 2).
16. ‘Such an idea can be fully justified (if at all) only by the conception of political justice to
which it eventually leads when worked out, and by how well that conception coheres with
our considered convictions of political justice at all levels in what we may call wide (and
general) reflective equilibrium’ (Rawls, 2001: 26, emphasis added).
17. One of the most famous maps, Harry Beck’s classic map of the London underground
system, closely resembles a ‘schematic’ electrical circuit diagram. (Beck was an electrical
draughtsman by trade.) Beck’s map is, indeed, ‘schematic’ in the sense to which I have
appealed: it picks out only the salient information about the relationship between
London tube stations,
the intended content identifies properties that are of interest . . . the spatial
relations of special concern include being connected by the same railway
line and being adjacent along the same railway line, but not being collinear
in physical space nor any metrical relations along the points depicted.
(Kitcher, 2001: 57).
Nevertheless, in his insightful discussion of Beck’s map, Philip Kitcher makes the key point
that its schematic nature is compatible with its complete accuracy: ‘the map is not approxi-
mately accurate. It is exact’ (Kitcher, 2001: 58).
18. Except for one, principled, indeterminacy in Rawls’s view, namely, that the fully deter-
minate specification of justice for the basic structure fails to determine the content of
‘local justice’ that applies within those institutions and associations that are independent
of the basic structure. See Rawls (2001: 11–12).
19. There is nothing in Williams comparable to Raymond Geuss’s repeated claim that
Rawls was a ‘trickle down’ apologist for capitalism. (For the latest statement of this
claim, see Geuss (2014b)). That depends, as Philippe van Parijs memorably puts it, on a
‘casual interpretation’ of the difference principle; van Parijs helpfully rebuts any such
interpretation in his (2002) page 204.
20. This does not commit me to denying Williams’s counterfactual claim that, were one to
ground a liberal view on a conception of personal autonomy, then this view would be in
bad faith. This would be so on the grounds that the very same ‘forces’ that make
liberalism an inescapable answer to the BLD ground that same notion of the person
(Williams, 2005: 8). But political liberalism does not permit any strictly political con-
ception of justice from being grounded on a controversial conception of autonomy – as
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it is in perfectionist or ‘ethical’ forms of liberalism. So Williams’s specific critique of
Nino (1991) does not extend to political liberalism.
21. In characterising the task of political philosophers, Rawls repeatedly uses the Hegelian
word ‘Verso¨hnung’, ‘reconciliation’. As Michael Hardimon has pointed out, the
German usage of this word is more committal than its comparatively neutral English
counterpart; it carries the strong overtone of a transformative overcoming of an initial
conflict (Hardimon, 1994: 85).
22. Freyenhagen, for example, takes Rawls’s project of reconciliation to be more optimistic
than the prospects for a liberalism of fear (Freyenhagen, 2011: 329). Yet it seems to me
that the latter’s aim to derive a liberalism from very basic facts about the nature of the
political is far more ambitious than Rawls’s calculatedly superficial argument. This is
crucial to Freyenhagen’s critique of political liberalism: he claims that Rawls’s arguments
for the possibility of an overlapping consensus are merely explanatory (so not normative
at all – neither moral nor political) (p. 326, 333). Yet he also claims that Rawls offers a
moral case, cast in terms of reasonableness (not rationality) for avoiding the oppressive
imposition of comprehensive views, (p. 327), and responds that the liberalism of fear does
just as well in dealing with this fact with fewer controversial assumptions. So everything
hinges on whether the liberalism of fear is political ‘in the wrong way’. Freyenhagen
equivocates over whether Rawls’s appeal to reasonableness is merely explanatory or a
moral basis for avoiding the fact of oppression. (My view is that it is the latter.) He then
draws a distinction between a ‘fully moral justification’ and a weak realism in which ‘the
influence of moral reasons and ideals on politics is not always futile or illegitimate’ and
opts for the latter (p. 334). I have argued here that this latter concessive realism (equally
describable as a concessive moralism) is a position that both political liberals and
(some) realists can converge on. So if the liberalism of fear is political ‘in the wrong
way’ then Freyenhagen is going to find himself (reluctantly) in the same camp as Rawls.
23. Specifically, the ‘fourth general fact’, namely
that the political culture of a democratic society has worked reasonably well
over a considerable period of time normally contains, at least implicitly, cer-
tain fundamental ideas from which it is possible to work up to a political
conception of justice suitable for a constitutional regime. (Rawls, 2001: 34–35)
See also the remark that
‘we start from the conviction that a constitutional democratic regime is just
and workable, and worth defending’ (Rawls, 2001: 37). For the necessary
conjunction of favourable conditions plus ‘political will’ (citing Weimar
Germany as possessing the former but not the latter), see Rawls (2001: 101).
24. Williams admonishes the liberal that he or she ought to begin from ‘starting from what
is at hand’, then introduces the quote that ‘In the beginning was the deed’ and moves on
from the role that that idea plays in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, a paradigmatic expres-
sion of the inferential contextualism that also underpins political liberalism (Thomas,
2006: chapter 11). I do not deny there is a substantive disagreement between me and
Williams here over how best to read On Certainty: for an extended defence of Williams’s
style of reading see McGinn (1989); for my reasons for dissenting see Thomas (2006:
173–174, fn. 13).
18 European Journal of Political Theory 0(0)
25. Williams is quite clear that for his narrow set of basic human rights he will be satisfied
with nothing less than ‘self-evidence’ as to their truth (Williams, 2005: 18–19). This sits
uneasily with the emphasis – in the very same paper – on Williams’s foundationalism
being grounded on practice, not belief (Williams, 2005: 24–25). As Jonathan Dancy once
remarked to me, this way of avoiding dogmatism in epistemology by appealing to the
presuppositions of a grounded practice replaces one dogmatism with another, namely
the dogmatic claim that practice and its presuppositions must be prior to theory and its
presuppositions.
26. The crux of the normative issue is whether Rawls’s rationale for the basic liberties gives
us more traction on the problem of the envisaged discriminatory society (involving
‘patriarchal ideas of the rights of women’ (Williams, 2005: 26) than Williams’s restricted
set of rights? Rawls’s rationale is the ‘rights and liberties specified by the liberty and
integrity (physical and psychological) of the person’ (Rawls, 2001: 44). That is vague,
and open to interpretation; Williams’s superficially competing position at least endorses
Thomas Nagel’s claim that it is paradigmatically a denial of a basic right to deny ‘civil
rights to women’ (Williams, 2005: 18), referring to Nagel (2000: 33–49 at p. 34). It seems
to me that the devil is in the details here, but that Williams’s schematic contrast fails to
supply the necessary details.
27. The point that the fate of such concepts as justice and autonomy in Williams’s narrative
was unclear was first made by Samuel Scheffler (1987).
28. The possibility of such an ‘indirect vindication’ for moral knowledge in Williams is
developed by Adrian Moore (2006) and Miranda Fricker (2000); for a critical discussion
see Thomas (2006: 154–160). I try, in that book, to show how a contextualist as opposed
to a foundational model for moral knowledge undermines Williams’s more radical
claims about the impact of reflection on the loss of our moral knowledge (paradigmat-
ically in Williams (1985) chapter seven).
29. Rawls discusses realistic utopianism and the favourable conditions for political liberal-
ism and justice as fairness in his (1999: 11–12) and (2001: 4, 13, 25, 32, 34–35, 37–38, 47,
87, 100–101).
30. The mapping of the three-way dialectic between Shklar, Rawls and Williams in
Forrester (2012) also concludes that ‘Shklar . . . . attempts to accommodate an appreci-
ation of Rawls within the realist framework’, p. 248. Rob Jubb, similarly, argues that
there are significant areas of overlap between Williams’s realism and Rawls’s putative
‘moralism’ in his (2014). However, Jubb’s helpful triangulation between their view and a
third party involves not a common origin (Shklar) but a common opponent – Cohen.
31. I have had a lot of help with this paper and I am very grateful to Kathryn
Brown, Jonathan Floyd, Katrina Forrester, Ed Hall, Rob Jubb, Charles Larmore,
Helen Longino, David Owen, Enzo Rossi and Matt Sleat for their comments and
criticisms.
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